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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 





Supreme Ct. Case No.: 20060508 
Court of Appeals No. 20050134-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION 
UTAH CODE ANN. §78-2-2(3)(a) provides this Court's jurisdiction over this appeal 
from the Memorandum Decision of the Utah Court of Appeals, dated May 4, 2006, (the 
"Decision") and designated as State v. Austin.. 2006 UT App. 184,2006 WL 1174241. A 
copy of the Memorandum Decision is attached hereto as Addendum "A" and incorporated 
herein by this reference. 
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS. STATEMENT OF 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL. AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
ISSUE 1: Whether this Court's holding in State v. Reves. 116 P3d 305 (Utah 
2005) applied to the Court of Appeals' consideration of Appellant's 
appeal, and whether the Court of Appeals erred in reviewing 
Appellant's challenges to the reasonable doubt jury instruction for 
plain error? 
STANDARD OF RE VffiW: "Detem^ 
to the jury presents a question of law, and we therefore review the trial court's instructions 
under a correction of error standard." State v. Gonzales, 2002 UT App 256, f 7,56 P.3d 969, 
(Utah App.,2002) citing Ames v. Maas. 846 P.2d 468,471 (Utah Ct.App.1993) 
ISSUE 2: Whether the instruction that the State's evidence must "eliminate all 
reasonable doubt" constituted reversible error in light of this Court's 
holding in Reyes? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: We review jury instructions under a correctness 
standard, granting no particular deference to the trial court. See Ong Int'l (U.S.A.) Inc. v. 11th 
Ave. Corp.. 850P.2d 447, 452 (Utah 1993); State v. Gibson. 908 P.2d 352, 354 (Utah 
Ct.App.1995), cert, denied, 917 P.2d 556 (Utah 1996). Statev.Stringham. 957 P.2d 602,607, 
(UtahApp.,1998). 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
I. UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, Amend. V, which reads as follows: 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise 
infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a 
Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, 
or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public 
danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to 
be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled 
in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be 
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; 
nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just 
compensation. 
II. UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, Amend. VI, which reads as follows: 
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In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to 
a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and 
district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which 
district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be 
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be 
confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory 
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the 
Assistance of Counsel for his defence. 
III. UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, Amend. XIV § 1, which reads as follows: 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject 
to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and 
of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce 
any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of 
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any 
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; 
nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws. 
IV. UT. CONST., ART. I § 7, which reads as follows: 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without 
due process of law 
V. UT. CONST., ART. I § 12, which reads as follows: 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to 
appear and defend in person and by counsel, to demand the 
nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a copy 
thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by the 
witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to compel 
the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy 
public trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which 
the offense is alleged to have been committed, and the right to 
appeal in all cases. In no instance shall any accused person, 
before final judgment, be compelled to advance money or fees 
to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused shall not be 
compelled to give evidence against himself; a wife shall not be 
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compelled to testify against her husband, nor a husband against 
his wife, nor shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the 
same offense. 
Where the defendant is otherwise entitled to a preliminary 
examination, the function of that examination is limited to 
determining whether probable cause exists unless otherwise 
provided by statute. Nothing in this constitution shall preclude 
the use of reliable hearsay evidence as defined by statute or rule 
in whole or in part at any preliminary examination to determine 
probable cause or at any pretrial proceeding with respect to 
release of the defendant if appropriate discovery is allowed as 
defined by statute or rule. 
VI. UT. CONST., ART. I § 24, which states that "[a]U laws of a general nature shall 
have uniform operation." 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On May 9,2004, Walter Pratt (hereinafter "Pratt") was allegedly stabbed to death in 
his truck and camper by Graham Austin (hereinafter "Austin") on River Road near Moab, 
Utah. Tr. Vol. I at pp.62, 63. On May 17, 2004, Austin was charged by Information with 
Murder, a first-degree felony. R001-R002. On June 16,2004, in an Amended Information, 
Austin was charged with Murder, a first-degree felony; Aggravated Robbery, a first-degree 
felony; Obstruction of Justice, a second degree felony, and Interference with an Arresting 
Officer; a class B misdemeanor. R038-040. On January 27, 2005, in a Second Amended 
Information, Austin was charged with Murder, a first-degree felony; Aggravated Robbery, 
a first-degree felony;-and Interference with an Arresting Officer, a class B misdemeanor. 
R0111-R0113. On February 2, 3, and 4, 2005, this matter came for trial before the 
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Honorable Lyle R. Anderson. Tr. Vol. I and II at p. 6. On February 4, 2005, Austin was 
found guilty of First-Degree Murder, Theft of an Operable Motor Vehicle, and Interference 
with an Arresting Officer. Tr. Vol. II at p. 157. Austin waived his right to delay sentencing 
and on February 4,2005, was sentenced to five years to life in the Utah State Prison on the 
charge of Murder in the First Degree, with a consecutive term of one to 15 years in the Utah 
State Prison for Theft "of an Operable Motor Vehicle and six months on the Interference with 
an Arresting Officer charge. Tr. Vol. II at p. 172. On February 4,2005, this Court entered 
its Judgement and Commitment to Utah State Prison, (hereinafter the "Judgment") in this 
matter (R0177-RO181). On February 10,2005 Austin timely filed his Notice of Appeal from 
the Judgment entered with respect to this matter. (R0182-RO183). On September 5, 2005, 
the Austin filed his Appellant's Brief with the Utah Court Of Appeals. On December 12, 
2005, the Respondent filed their Appellee's Brief with the Utah Court of Appeals. On 
January 17,2006, the Austin filed his Reply Brief with the Utah Court of Appeals. On May 
4,2006, the Utah Court of Appeals issued their Memorandum Decision (the "Decision") for 
this matter, stating that, as they had held in State v. Halls. 2006 UT app 142, "we are not 
persuaded that the use of 'eliminate all reasonable doubt' constitutes plain error. Id at ^ 20. 
We conclude that the jury instruction, "taken as whole, correctly communicatefd] the 
principle of reasonable doubt." State v. Austin. 2006 UT App 184 If 1. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On May 9,2004, Walter Pratt (hereinafter "Pratt") was allegedly stabbed to 
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death in his truck and camper by Graham Austin (hereinafter "Austin") on River Road near 
Moab, Utah. Tr. Vol. I at pp.62,63. Ms. Heather Meacham (hereinafter "Ms. Meacham") 
and her four children allegedly witnessed the murder on their way to a graduation in 
Colorado. Tr. Vol. I at p.72. As Ms. Meacham drove eastbound after passing the crime 
scene, she glanced in her rear view mirror and saw Austin right behind her in Pratt's truck, 
so she sped up in an attempt to get away from Austin. Tr. Vol. I at p. 78. Ms. Meacham 
testified that, as she approached the turn-off to Cisco that leads to 1-70, she no longer saw 
Austin behind her. Id. 
During this time, Mr. Chris Garland ("Garland"), testified that he drove upon the 
crime scene and saw Pratt stagger across the road. Tr. Vol. I at pp. 103,104,105. Garland 
testified that he approached Pratt to see if he was okay but did not receive any response from 
him. Tr. Vol. I at p. 104. Garland testified that he then walked back to his vehicle and dialed 
"911" on his cell phone. Tr. Vol. I at p. 105. 
Mr. David Brown ("Brown") testified that he was on his way to work when he 
came upon the scene and saw Garland on his cell phone. Tr. Vol. I pp. 110, 111. Seeing 
Garland on his cell phone in the middle of the road, Brown testified that he thought the 
situation was under control. Id. As Brown drove past, however, he testified that he noticed 
Pratt's body on the side of the road, so he came back and approached Garland, who was still 
on his cell phone with the Sheriffs Office. Tr. Vol. I. P. 111. Officer Louis Manson 
("Manson") who is with the Sheriffs department testified that he arrived on the scene and 
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saw three vehicles on the side of the road and the victim on the left shoulder. Tr. Vol. I at 
p. 116. He testified that he checked the victim and found no pulse, and then spoke with the 
witnesses. Id. One of the cars on the side of the road was a red Ford that did not belong to 
either of the witnesses. Id. Manson testified that he checked the plates of the Ford and found 
it registered to Graham Austin of Clifton, Colorado. Manson also testified that he discovered 
that the victim was Walter Pratt of South Dakota by locating his driver's license. Tr. Vol. 
I at p. 117. As the scene was being secured, Officer Andy Peterson (hereinafter "Peterson"), 
a highway patrol trooper, testified that he was called out to help locate the victim's vehicle. 
Tr. Vol. I at p. 145. He received information that the victim's vehicle was headed towards 
Colorado. Tr. Vol. I at p. 146. Peterson testified that he met up with Officer Darrell 
Meacham (hereinafter "Meacham") and they proceeded in opposite directions looking for 
the victim's vehicle. Tr. Vol. I at p. 148. Peterson testified he met up with what is known 
as the Pipeline Road and spotted what appeared to be dual wheel tracks. Tr. Vol. I at p. 149. 
Having received information that the victim's vehicle was a one-ton pickup truck with a 
camper on it, Peterson testified that he proceeded down the road and came upon the truck and 
camper. Id. Peterson testified that he then informed dispatch and Meacham that he had 
found the suspect vehicle. Tr. Vol. I at p. 150 
While Peterson was waiting for the arrival of Meacham, he testified that Austin got 
out of the truck and left on foot. Tr. Vol. I at p. 150. Once Meacham arrived, he testified that 
he and Peterson proceeded to follow Austin down a trail to a culvert. Tr. Vol. I at p. 151. 
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Meacham testified that he discovered Austin on the opposite of the culvert under a tree and 
ordered him to come out. Id. Meacham testified that Austin refused to come out voluntarily 
so Peterson pulled him out by his feet. Tr. Vol. I at p. 153. Once Austin was arrested, 
Peterson testified that he handcuffed him and took him to Manson's vehicle who had been 
sent to the scene. Tr. Vol. I pp. 122, 123, 157. Manson testified that, as Austin was taken 
into custody, he uttered the statement "Just shoot me." Tr. Vol. I at p. 123. 
On May 17, 2004, Austin was charged by Information with Murder, a first-degree 
felony. R001-R002. On June 16, 2004, in an Amended Information, Austin was charged 
with Murder, a first-degree felony; Aggravated Robbery, a first-degree felony; Obstruction 
of Justice, a second degree felony; and Interference with an Arresting Officer, a class B 
misdemeanor. R03 8-040. On January 27, 2005, in a Second Amended Information, Austin 
was; charged with Murder, a first-degree felony, Aggravated Robbery, a first-degree felony, 
and Interference with an Arresting Officer, a class B misdemeanor. R0111-R0113. 
On February 2,3, and 4,2005, this matter came to trial before the Honorable Lyle R. 
Anderson. Tr. Vol. I and II at p. 6. At trial, Austin's trial counsel informed the trial court 
that the only exception they had to the jury instruction was that the court used the word 
"eliminate" instead of "obviate" and Appellant's trial counsel wanted the word "obviate" 
used. Tr. Vol. II at p. 128. The trial court informed Appellant's trial counsel that the court 
had polled many jurors and discovered that most jurors did not understand what the word 
obviate meant and that since eliminate meant the same as "obviate," the trial court would use 
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the word "eliminate"ihstead. Id. This was the only exception of Appellant's trial counsel 
to the jury instructions, and it was overruled by the trial court. Tr. Vol. II at p. 130. 
On February 4, 2005, Austin was found guilty of first-degree Murder, Theft of an 
Operable Motor Vehicle, and Interference with an Arresting Officer. Tr. Vol. II at p. 157. 
Austin waived his right to delay sentencing and, on February 4,2005, was sentenced to five 
years to life in the Utah State Prison on the charge of Murder in the First Degree, with a 
consecutive term of one to 15 years in the Utah State Prison for Theft of an Operable Motor 
Vehicle and six months on the Interference with an Arresting Officer charge. Tr. Vol. II at 
p. 172. 
On February 4,2005, this Court entered the Judgment in this matter (R0177-RO181). 
On February 10,2005 Austin timely filed his Notice of Appeal from the Judgment entered 
with respect to this matter. (R0182-R0183). On September 5, 2005, the Austin filed his 
Appellant's Brief with the Utah Court Of Appeals. On December 12,2005, the Respondent 
filed their Appellee's Brief with the Utah Court of Appeals. On January 17,2006, the Austin 
filed his Reply Brief with the Utah Court of Appeals. On May 4,2006, the Utah Court of 
Appeals issued their Decision. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
This Court determined in a decision handed down on June 7,2005, that the element 
of "obviate all reasonable doubt" in a reasonable doubt jury instruction carried with it the 
substantial risk of causing a juror to find guilt in a criminal case based on a degree of proof 
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below beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Reves. 2005 UT 33, f30. On April 13,2006, the 
Utah Court of Appeals issued its decision in State v. Halls. 2006 UT App 142, - P.3d-, 
which relies upon Reyes and the use of the phrase "obviate all reasonable doubt" in a jury 
instruction. The Court of Appeals applied the plain error standard and ruled that there was 
no error and no injustice in using this phrase, as long as the instruction as a whole correctly 
conveyed the principle of reasonable doubt to the jury. Halls at f20. In rendering its 
decision in the instant matter, the Court of Appeals relied upon Halls. The Court of Appeals 
decision in Halls and subsequently herein contradicts this Court's holding in Reyes by failing 
to recognize the substantial risk inherent with the phrase and violates the standard as held in 
Victor v.Nebraska. 511 U.S. 1, 114 S. Ct. 1239,127 L.Ed.2d 583 (1994). 
ARGUMENT 
THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN THEIR 
DECISION REGARDING THE REASONABLE DOUBT JURY INSTRUCTION 
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS DECISION ERRONEOUSLY APPLIED THE 
PLAIN ERROR STANDARD IN A MATTER WHERE THE LAW HAD 
CLEARLY CHANGED ON APPEAL. 
The Utah Court of Appeals recently decided the case of State v. Halls. 2006 UT App 
142, - P.3d -, in which it determined that, although this Court abandoned the language of 
"obviate all reasonable doubt" in State v. Reves. 2005 UT 33,116 P.3d 305, the Utah Court 
of Appeals did not believe that the phrase "eliminate all reasonable doubt" created manifest 
injustice because the instruction taken as a whole correctly conveyed the principle of 
reasonable doubt to the jury. State v. Halls. 2006 UT App 142 1J20. The inherent risk 
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associated with this phrase was not addressed by the Court of Appeals. In issuing their 
decision in this matter, the Utah Court of Appeals relied on Halls and its holding stating that, 
as long as the jury instruction as a whole correctly conveyed the concept of reasonable doubt, 
no error or manifest injustice existed. Austin. 2006 UT App. 184, Tfl. The same phrase 
"eliminate all reasonable doubt" was used in the jury instruction at Austin's trial, and argued 
before the Utah Court of Appeals. By ruling that the instruction as a whole correctly 
conveyed the principle of beyond a reasonable doubt to the jury, the Utah Court of Appeals 
has contradicted the decision of this court in Statev.Reves. and caused a substantial risk that 
Austin was convicted on a degree of proof below that of beyond a reasonable doubt, just as 
this court found in Reyes. 
In Reyes this Court undertook the following analysis: 
[^25 The court of appeals found merit in Mr. Reyes's claim that the trial court 
erred when it failed to expressly instruct that the State's proof must "obviate 
all reasonable doubt" as mandated by Robertson. Id. at 119. The "obviate all 
reasonable doubt" test found life in Justice Stewart's dissent in State v. Ireland. 
773 P.2d 1375,1380-82 (Utah 1989) (Stewart, J., dissenting). There, Justice 
Stewart took issue with an instruction that equated "beyond a reasonable 
doubt" with "an abiding conviction of the truth of the charge." Id. He 
reasoned that since the standard to be applied is "beyond a reasonable doubt," 
it followed that any definition of the standard must reference the 
obstacle-reasonable doubt-to be overcome by the evidence, and must convey 
the principle that the State must surmount the obstacle of reasonable doubt to 
justify a conviction. Id. The "obviate all reasonable doubt" concept appears 
to derive from a feat that in ascertaining the conviction of the truth of a charge 
against a defendant, a juror might misapply the "beyond a reasonable doubt" 
standard unless she is required to search out, confront, and defeat reasonable 
doubt with evidence. 
[^26 Insightful and important as Justice Stewart's image of "beyond a 
reasonable doubt" may be, his suggestion that the jury be instructed to "obviate 
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all reasonable doubt" is both linguistically opaque and conceptually suspect. 
Not every jury will confront evidence in its deliberations sufficient to create 
a reasonable doubt. The notion of "obviating" doubt is cumbersome at best 
where proof is scant or lacking in credibility. In these instances, a description 
of "beyond a reasonable doubt" that asks jurors to rate the magnitude of their 
conviction concerning the strength of the evidence imparts a more accurate and 
useful concept of "beyond a reasonable doubt" than does a construct that 
requires jurors to identify doubts and assess whether the evidence overcomes 
them. A universal application of the notion that the State must "obviate all 
reasonable doubt" can be achieved only by tying it to the concept of the 
presumption of innocence. If innocence is thought of as an array of inchoate 
reasonable doubts that the State must overcome to attain a conviction, it 
follows that the State must "obviate all reasonable doubt" in every case. We 
do not, however, endorse this unwieldy view of the presumption of innocence. 
TJ27 The process suggested by the "obviate all reasonable doubt"standard is 
also flawed because, contrary to its purpose, it tends to diminish the degree 
of proof necessary to convict and in that respect violates the Victor 
standard. The "obviation" of doubt contemplates a two-step'undertaking: the 
identification of the doubt and a testing of the validity of the doubt against the 
evidence. This process suggests a back and forth disputation of a doubt's 
merits, all to the end of determining whether the evidence is sufficient to 
"obviate" the doubt. The "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard does not, 
however, condition a conclusion that a doubt is reasonable on an ability either 
to articulate the doubt or to state a reason for it. An unarticulated conviction 
that the State has failed to meet its burden of proof will serve as a legitimate 
basis to acquit. 
TJ28 To the extent that the Robertson "obviate" test would permit the State to 
argue that it need only obviate doubts that are sufficiently defined, the test 
works to improperly diminish the State's burden. Writing in the Notre 
Dame Law Review, Professor Steve Sheppard criticized the expanding 
prominence of the requirement that doubts be articulated. Steve Sheppard, The 
Metamorphoses of Reasonable Doubt: How Changes in the Burden of Proof 
Have Weakened the Presumption of Innocence. 78 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1165 
(2003). Professor Sheppard summarized the central vice of this trend this way: 
A troubling conclusion that arises from the difficulties of the requirement of 
articulability is that it hinders the juror who has a doubt based on the belief that 
the totality of the evidence is insufficient. Such a doubt lacks the specificity 
implied in an obligation to "give a reason," an obligation that appears focused 
on the details of the arguments. Yet this is precisely the circumstance in which 
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the rhetoric of the law, particularly the presumption of innocence and the state 
burden of proof, require acquittal. Id at 1213. 
f 29 Central to our reconsideration of the merits of the "obviate all reasonable 
doubt" element of Robertson is our belief that the exacting demands of the 
"beyond a reasonable doubt" standard can be clearly and fairly communicated 
through an affirmative description of the degree of conviction that must be 
attained by a juror based on the evidence. We see little to be gained by 
including within a "beyond a reasonable doubt" instruction the potentially 
confusing concept that every defendant is entitled to a presumption of 
reasonable doubt, which the State's evidence must obviate. 
%30 Because we conclude that "the obviate all reasonable doubt" element 
of Robertson test carries with it the substantial risk of causing a juror to 
find guilt based on a degree of proof below beyond a reasonable doubt, we 
expressly abandon it. 
Reves at Iff 24-30 (emphasis added.) 
In Halls, the Court of Appeals held that because Halls did not object to the jury 
instruction at trial, therefore not meeting the requirements under UT. R. CIV. P. 19(e), that the 
instruction could only be assigned an error to avoid manifest injustice. Manifest injustice is 
"synonymous with the plain error standard." Halls at f 13-14. Therefore, the Court of 
Appeals reviewed the instruction under the plain error standard in Halls and in the instant 
matter. However, the Court of Appeals erroneously applied the plain error standard to this 
matter and failed to address the issue of exceptional circumstances. 
Exceptional circumstances are explained as "those which would explain and excuse 
a party's failure to raise a claimed error in the trial court." State v. Webb. 790 P.2d 65 (Utah 
App.1990). "The exceptional circumstances concept serves as a 'safety device,9 to assure 
that manifest injustice does not result from the failure to consider an issue on appeal." State 
v. Archambeau 820 P.2d 920, 923 (Utah App. 1991). "Unlike 'plain error,' 'exceptional 
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circumstances' is not so much a precise doctrine, which may be analyzed in terms of fixed 
elements, as it is a descriptive term used to memorialize an appellate court's judgment that 
even though an issue was not raised below and even though the plain error doctrine does not 
apply, unique procedural circumstances nonetheless permit consideration of the merits of the 
issue on appeal." State v. Irwin> 924 P.2d 5 (Utah App. 1996). In State v. Lopez. 831 P.2d 
1040 (Utah App. 1992), the Utah Court of Appeals employed the "exceptional circumstances" 
rubric where a change in law or the settled interpretation of law colored the failure to have 
raised an issue at trial. 
The federal courts have expanded upon the concept of exceptional circumstances, as 
argued by Austin before the Utah Court of Appeals and utilized in Utah courts, to include a 
"plain error" concept at the stage of appeal. The United States Supreme Court explained in 
Johnson v. United States. 520 U.S. 461,117S.Ct. 1544,1549,137 L.Ed.2d 718 (1997), that 
"...where the law at the time of trial was settled and clearly contrary to the law at the time of 
appeal-it is enough that an error be 'plain9 at the time of appellate consideration." Id The 
United States Supreme Court agreed that the alternative would "...result in counsel's 
inevitably making a long and virtually useless laundry list of objections to rulings that were 
plainly supported by existing precedent." Id., 520 U.S. at 468,117 S. Ct. at 1549. 
In Johnson, the U.S. Supreme Court discussed the plain error test as applied in United 
States v. Olano. 507 U.S. 725, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508. Under the Olano test 
"before an appellate court can correct an error not raised at trial, there must be (1) "error," 
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(2) that is "plain/9 and (3) that "affect[s] substantial rights."507 U.S., at 732, 113 S.Ct., at 
1776. Johnson at 467. 
The United States Supreme Court has also held that, "a new rule for the conduct of 
criminal prosecutions is to be applied retroactively to all cases — pending on direct review 
•••, with no exception for cases in which the new rule constitutes a 'clear break9 with the 
past" Johnson v. United States. 520 U.S. at 467, citing Griffith v. Kentucky. 479 U.S. 314 
107 S. Ct.708, 93 L.Ed.2d 649 (1987). The United States Supreme Court addressed the 
retroactivity analysis1 when it stated: 
Specifically, we concluded that the retroactivity analysis for convictions that 
have become final must be different from the analysis for convictions that are 
not final at the time the new decision is issued. We observed that, in a number 
of separate opinions since Linkletter [Linkletter v. Walker. 381 U.S. 618, 85 
S.Ct. 1731, 14 L.Ed.2d 601 (1965)], various Members of the Court have 
asserted that, at a minimum, all defendants whose cases were still pending on 
direct appeal at the time of the law-changing decision should be entitled to 
invoke the new rule." 
Griffith v. Kentucky. 479 U.S. 314, 107 S.Ct. 708 321-322, U.S.Ky.,1987, citing United 
States v. Johnson 57 U.S. 537, 545, 102 S.Ct, 2579, 2584, 73 L.Ed.2d 202 (1982). The 
Court decided that, because the law had changed during the time in which Johnson's case 
was pending direct review, Johnson met the first factor of the Olano test evidencing that there 
was an error. 
1
 Austin does not intend to raise the question of whether the determination in Reyes was 
"retroactive" under the typical meaning of the word as it pertains to changes in the law in Utah, 
but raises it only as it is applied under the Johnson analysis to cases currently pending on direct 
appeal whose decisions are not yet final. 
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In the instant matter, the law regarding the reasonable doubt jury instruction at the 
time of Austin's trial was settled. However, prior to Austin's appeal being filed, the law had 
changed based on this Court's holding in Reyes. Therefore, under Griffith, the change to the 
law regarding the reasonable doubt jury instruction must be applied retroactively to Austin's 
case. As the law changed during the time Austin's case was on direct review, an error does 
exist and the first factor of the Olano test has been met. Applying Reyes retroactively means 
that the reasonable doubt jury instruction which included the phrase "eliminate all reasonable 
doubt" violated the Victor standards and is therefore unconstitutional as held in Reyes. 
The second prong of the Olano test is that the error must be plain, however, in Olano. 
the United States Supreme Court did not address at what stage of direct review the error must 
be plain, only that it must be plain under current law. Johnson at 467 (emphasis added). In 
Johnson the error at the time of appeal was clear but was not clear at the time of trial, 
therefore, the Court ruled that the second prong of the Olano test had been met. In the instant 
matter, at the time of Austin's trial, the law regarding the reasonable doubt jury instruction 
was settled, no error existed, and there was nothing to which his trial counsel should have 
objected; however, at the time of appeal the law had changed and, under current law, a plain 
error thus existed. As the Court ruled in Johnson, "it is enough that an error be plain" at the 
time of appellate consideration." Johnson at 468. Therefore, under the plain error on appeal 
standard and as stated in Johnson, the second factor in Olano has clearly been met. 
The third prong of Olano is that the error must affect substantial rights. In Johnson, 
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the Court held that the plain error fit within the scope of limited cases in which structural 
error existed, but did not determine that Johnson had proven that the error affected her 
substantial rights. The Court cited a case in which it held that, "the erroneous definition of 
'reasonable doubt9 vitiated all of the jury's findings because one could only speculate what 
a properly charged jury might have done." Johnson at 469, citing Sullivan v. Louisiana. 508 
U.S. 275,280,113 S.Ct. 2078,2082,124 L.Ed.2d 182 (1993). Although the United States 
Supreme Court determined that Johnson did not meet the third factor under Olano, this is not 
the case in the instant matter. 
In the instant matter, the use of the phrase "eliminate all reasonable doubt" had a 
substantial affect on Austin's rights based upon this Court's determination in Reyes. 
Allowing the jury to use a phrase that has since been ruled constitutionally unsound affected 
Austin's rights because, as stated in Sullivan, it rendered the jury findings ineffective and 
only allowed the appellate court to speculate on what the jury may have done had they 
received a proper instruction. Allowing the jury to convict under the deficient instruction 
led to a substantial risk that Austin was convicted on a standard that fell below that of the 
standard of "beyond a reasonable doubt." Use of the phrase affected Austin's right to a fair 
trial, severely prejudicing Austin's constitutional rights. UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 
AMEND. VI and UTAH STATE CONSTITUTION. ART. I § 12. 
The 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals has also analyzed the issue of "plain error on appeal" 
and explained that the question at issue here is not whether the error was plain at time of trial, 
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but whether it is plain based on current law at the time of direct appeal. United States v. 
Retos. 25 F.3d 1220 (3d Cir. 1994)(emphasis added). In U.S. v. West Indies Transport. Inc.. 
the 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals also analyzed this issue as it applies specifically to jury 
instructions and found that "...where a defendant submits proposed jury instructions in 
reliance on current law, and on direct appeal that law is declared constitutionally infirm, we 
will not apply the invited error doctrine." Ibid, 111 F.3d 299 (3rd Cir. 1997). 
The Utah Court of Appeals failed to address the issue regarding the application of 
exceptional circumstances in the instant matter. The law in this matter was settled at the time 
of Austin's trial, therefore, Austin's trial counsel could not have reasonably objected at trial, 
because no issue existed at that time. As Johnson stated, to place the burden in these 
instances on counsel to object would "...result in counsel's inevitably making a long and 
virtually useless laundry list of objections to rulings that were plainly supported by existing 
precedent." Ibid., 520 U.S. at 468,117 S. Ct. at 1549. When Austin filed his appeal, there 
had been a substantial change in law and the interpretation of the law that would allow 
Utah's exceptional circumstances rubric to apply. The Utah Court of Appeals, however, 
erroneously applied Utah's "plain error" standard rather than the federal "plain error on 
appeal" standard in both Halls, and subsequently in the instant matter. The Utah Court of 
Appeals clearly should have applied the expanded "plain error on appeal" standard found 
under Johnson, supra, which mimics Utah's "exceptional circumstances" rubric. 
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Utah's "plain error"standard would have required that the trial court be aware of this 
Court's determination in Reyes prior to the decision being rendered and would place an 
undue burden on the trial court to predict its outcome or merit reversal based on their failure 
to do so. As the trial court is not clairvoyant, it was not possible for them to do this nor 
should they be expected to do so. By failing to apply the correct "exceptional circumstances" 
rubric or the Johnson "plain error on appeal" standard, the Utah Court of Appeals mistakenly 
determined that Austin's due process rights and right to an impartial jury were protected. In 
its erroneous decision, the Utah Court of Appeals instead violated Austin's rights under the 
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION and the UTAH CONSTITUTION, as cited herein supra. 
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS DECISION HEREIN CONTRADICTS STATE V, 
REYES, 
The error in the reasonable doubt jury instruction in this matter, as in Halls, was the 
use of the phrase "eliminate all reasonable doubt." However, in Halls, the Court of Appeals 
held that the "eliminate all reasonable doubt" jury instruction was less troublesome than the 
"obviate all reasonable doubt jury instruction." Halls at |15. This cannot be so. As was 
discussed by Appellant's trial counsel and the trial court prior to the jury receiving the 
instructions, informing the jury that the State must "eliminate all reasonable doubt" is no 
different than being told the State must "obviate all reasonable doubt." Neither instruction 
can be considered less "troublesome" than the other. Using the word "eliminate" in the jury 
instruction in the instant matter led to the same substantial risk Reyes faced, namely that 
Austin was found guilty on a standard lower than that of beyond a reasonable doubt. 
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Austin's trial counsel asked for the word "obviate" to be used in the jury instruction, but was 
informed by the trial court that it had discovered that jurors did not know what the word 
"obviate" meant. Austin's trial counsel indicated that it meant "eliminate," and the trial court 
agreed and used the word "eliminate" instead so jurors would understand the meaning of the 
word "obviate." Tr. Vol. II at p. 128. 
Allowing the word "eliminate" to be used created an even greater risk that Austin was 
convicted based on a standard that is less than beyond a reasonable doubt. In Reyes this 
Court stated as follows: 
The notion of 'obviating' doubt is cumbersome at best where proof is scant or 
lacking in credibility. In these instances, a description of "beyond a reasonable 
doubt" that asks jurors to rate the magnitude of their convictitin concerning the 
strength of the evidence imparts a more accurate and useful concept of 
"beyond a reasonable doubt" than does a construct that requires jurors to 
identify doubts and assess whether the evidence overcomes them. 
Reyes at [^26 (emphasis added). Requiring jurors to identify doubts and determine if the 
evidence overcomes them is, in essence, requiring them to "eliminate" all doubts. This 
process diminishes the standard that is necessary to convict and that standard has been 
abandoned by this Court. The Utah Court of Appeals erred in determining that using the 
phrase "eliminate all reasonable doubt" was less troublesome than "obviate all reasonable 
doubt" because using the word "eliminate" created an even greater risk that Austin was 
convicted based on a standard that lower than that of beyond a reasonable doubt. 
In Halls, the Court of Appeals relies on the language in Victor v. Nebraska. 511 U.S. 
1,114 S. Ct 1239,127 L.Ed.2d 583 (1994) to hold that, as long as the jury instruction taken 
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as a whole correctly conveys the concept of reasonable doubt to the jury, the requirements 
of due process are met. Halls at [^16; see also, State v. Reyes, 2005 UT 33, f 15, quoting 
Victor v.Nebraska. 511 U.S. 1,114 S. Ct. 1239,127 L.ED.2d 583 (1994). However, Victor 
also holds that a reasonable doubt jury instruction must not "create a reasonable likelihood 
that 6a reasonable jurorxould have interpreted the instruction to allow a finding of guilt based 
on a degree of proof below that required by the Due Process Clause.' " Reyes at |18, citing 
Victor at 6 {quoting Cage v. Louisiana. 498 U.S. 39, 41, 111 S. Ct. 328, 112 L.Ed.2d 339 
(1990). 
If the remainder of the instruction conveyed the principle of "beyond a reasonable 
doubt" to the jury, using the phrase "eliminate all reasonable doubt" still caused that 
instruction to carry the substantial risk that a juror found Austin guilty based on a degree of 
proof lower than "beyond a reasonable doubt." As this Court pointed out, use of the phrase 
"eliminate all reasonable doubt" in a jury instruction violates Victor, no matter what concept 
the remainder of the instruction may convey. Although Victor states that there is no due 
process violation as long as the instruction as a whole correctly coveys the concept of beyond 
a reasonable doubt, it is not possible to use a phrase in that instruction that has been declared 
to carry a substantial risk, because it violates that Victor standard. Victor also states that the 
instruction cannot create a likelihood that guilt will be determined on a standard less than that 
of "beyond a reasonable doubt." For the reasonable doubt jury instruction to comply with 
Victor standards in this matter, the phrase "eliminate all reasonable doubt" could not exist 
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in the instruction. The standards as set forth in Victor cannot be met as long as the phrase 
"eliminate all reasonable doubt" is included in the instruction. As analyzed by this Court in 
Reyes, it is not possible to have a constitutionally sound instruction that includes the phrase 
"eliminate all reasonable doubt." 
This Court specifically analyzed Victor and how the phrase "obviate all reasonable 
doubt" violated its standards when it stated in Reyes: 
The process suggested by the "obviate all reasonable doubt" standard is also 
flawed because, contrary to its purpose, it tends to dimmish the degree of 
proof necessary to convict and in that respect violates the Victor standard. 
The "obviatidn" of doubt contemplates a two-step undertaking: the 
identification of the doubt and a testing of the validity of the doubt against the 
evidence. This process suggests a back and forth disputation of a doubt's 
merits, all to the end of determining whether the evidence is sufficient to 
"obviate" the doubt. The "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard does not, 
however, condition a conclusion that a doubt is reasonable on an ability either 
to articulate the doubt or to state a reason for it. An unarticulated conviction 
that the State has failed to meet its burden of proof will serve as a legitimate 
basis to acquit. 
Reyes. 2005 UT 33, f27,116 P.3d 305 (emphasis added). On the basis that it diminishes the 
degree of proof necessary to convict, the phrases "obviate all reasonable doubt" or "eliminate 
all reasonable doubt" cannot be utilized. Therefore, the remainder of the instruction cannot 
adequately convey the concept of "beyond a reasonable doubt" since the phrase "eliminate 
all reasonable doubt" was included. Thus, in the instant matter, the Victor standard was 
violated. 
In rendering their decision in Halls. 2006 UT App. 142, the Utah Court of Appeals 
also relies on the matter of State v. Cruz. 2005 UT 45, %L 1,122 P.3d 543, in which this Court 
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reiterated the Victor standard as the standard under which reasonable doubt jury instructions 
would be reviewed. In Cruz the State argued that the reasonable doubt jury instruction test 
as set forth in State v. Robertson, 932 P.2d 1219 (Utah 1997), should be overruled. As set 
forth by Reyes, this Court complied and held that the Victor standard for reasonable doubt 
jury instructions would apply. Cruz did not expand upon the Victor standards, nor did it 
overrule any of this Court's holdings in Reyes. In fact, Cruz upheld Reyes and reiterated that 
the Victor standard would apply to reasonable doubt jury instructions. 
In Reyes, this Court held that the "obviate all reasonable doubt" concept was 
"linguistically opaque and conceptually suspect" and that the potential problem with this 
phrase is that it requires a two step undertaking which includes identification of the doubt 
and testing of the validity of the doubt against the evidence. Hall at f 17. Allowing that 
phrase to be used in a jury instruction carries with it a substantial risk of guilt being founded 
on a standard lower than that of "beyond a reasonable doubt." A phrase that was determined 
to be "linguistically opaque and conceptually suspect" by this Court should not be used in 
a jury instruction, hence this Court's abandonment of the phrase. The Court of Appeals 
contends that, because the instruction as used in Halls did not convey the message that the 
State need only refute doubts that are sufficiently defined and the State may not have argued 
that a juror needed to articulate and eliminate specific doubts, there was no error or risk 
associated with this instruction. itfat^[18. However, under this Court's determination, the 
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substantial inherent risk still existed based on the use of the phrase "eliminate all reasonable 
doubt" State v.Reves. 2005 UT 33, fl8,116 P.3d 305. 
Further, in Halls the Court of Appeals failed to address the substantial risk associated 
with the phrase "obviate" or "eliminate" all reasonable doubt. They simply held that, if the 
instruction as a whole correctly conveys the principle of reasonable doubt as set forth under 
Victor then there is no injustice or error. This contradicts this courts abandonment of the 
phrase in Reyes and its holding with regards to the substantial risk associated with the use 
of that phrase. This Court specifically indicated that this phrase violates Victor standards, 
which are those upon which the Utah Court of Appeals relied in its decision in both Halls and 
the instant matter. Because that phrase violates the Victor standards it is not possible for the 
instruction which contains that phrase to be used without creating a substantial risk that 
Austin was convicted on a standard below that of beyond a reasonable doubt. 
The Utah Court of Appeals recently held that "[t]he federal Equal Protection Clause 
and state's Uniform Operation of Laws Clause embody the same general principle: persons 
similarly situated should be treated similarly, and persons in different circumstances should 
not be treated as if their circumstances were the same." State ex. rel. Z.C.. 2005 UT App 
562, f 8, fh. 5,128 P.3d 561. It is clear from the analysis above that the reasonable doubt jury 
instruction used at the trial in this matter has been declared unconstitutional by Reyes in that 
it carries a substantial risk that a jury could find a defendant guilty of a standard lower than 
beyond a reasonable doubt. The jury instruction used in the instant matter and the jury 
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instructions used in Reyes both contained the phrase carrying with it this substantial risk. 
Therefore, Austin should be afforded the same relief that was afforded Reyes with regards 
to the reasonable doubt jury instruction. Their circumstances are similar and therefore, the 
protection of their rights by the Utah appellate courts should be similar. The Fedora! Equal 
Protection Clause and the Uniform Operation of Laws Clause require that all people be 
treated similarly, and the Utah Court of Appeals failed to do so in the instant matter. UNITED 
STATES CONST., AMEND. XIV; UTAH CONST., ART. I § 24. 
The Utah Court of Appeals rendered a decision in this matter that directly contradicts 
this Court's decision in Reves. effectively violating Austin's constitutional rights under U.S. 
CONST. AMENDS. V, VI and XIV, and UTAH CONST., ART. I §§7,12 and 24. 
Based upon the foregoing, Appellant respectfully request that because of the 
reversible error in the reasonable doubt jury instruction that this Court reverse the Decision 
entered by the Utah Court of Appeals on May 4,2006, and enter such further orders as this 
Court deems appropriate. 
DATED this \2> day of October, 2006. 
William L.Schultz 
Attorney for Appellant 
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MEMORANDUM DECISION (Not For Official 
Publication) 
BENCH, Presiding Judge: 
*1 Defendant Graham Woodruff Austin argues, 
under the standard set forth in State v. Reyes, 2005 
UT 33, f 30, 116 P.3d 305, that part of the 
reasonable doubt jury instruction-"[i]t is the burden 
of the State to eliminate all reasonable doubt" 
-violated his due process rights. Because Defendant 
did not object to the reasonable doubt jury 
instruction at trial, he asserts plain error on appeal. 
See State v. Halls, 2006 UT App 142, If 13-14. " 
Under the first prong of the plain error standard, 
Defendant must show that '[a]n error exists." ' Id. 
at | 15 (alteration in original) (citation omitted). " 
[I]f Defendant's reasonable doubt jury instruction, 
taken as a whole, ... correctly convey[ed] the 
concept of reasonable doubt to the jury, then it was 
not erroneous." Id at f 16 (omission and second 
alteration in original) (quotations and citations 
In the instant matter, the "reasonable doubt jury 
instruction given at Defendant's trial did not convey 
the message that the State must only eliminate those 
doubts that are sufficiently defined; neither did the 
State argue that the juror need articulate and 
eliminate specific doubts." Id at % 19. As we held 
in Halls, "we are not persuaded that the use of * 
eliminate all reasonable doubt" ' constitutes plain 
error. Id at K 20. We conclude that the jury 
instruction, "taken as a whole, correctly 
communicate[d] the principle of reasonable doubt." 
State v. Cruz, 2005 UT 45, J 21, 122 P.3d 543. 
Defendant also asserts that the trial court erred by 
(1) imposing consecutive sentences without the 
benefit of a presentence investigation report (PSI) 
and (2) failing to adequately consider Defendant's 
history, remorse, and rehabilitative needs in 
violation of Utah Code section 76-3-401(2), see 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(2) (2003). 
"Prior to the imposition of any sentence, the court 
may, with the concurrence of the defendant, 
continue the date for the imposition of sentence ... 
for the purpose of obtaining a[PSI] ... or 
information from other sources about the defendant. 
" Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-l(5Xa) (Supp.2005) 
(emphasis added). FNI This statute gives the trial 
court discretion to impose a sentence without 
ordering a PSI. See State v. Madsen, 2002 UT App 
345, 11 13-15, 57 P.3d 1134. Additionally, 
Defendant specifically requested that the trial court " 
waive his time for sentencing and be sentenced 
today," knowing that no PSI would be completed. 
The trial court granted Defendant's request and 
sentenced him immediately after the trial concluded. 
Therefore, the trial court did not err in sentencing 
Defendant without the benefit of a PSI. 
FNI. There have been no relevant 
amendments to the applicable statutes 
© 2006 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
Not Reported in P.3d 
Not Reported in P.3d, 2006 WL 1174241 (Utah App.), 2006 UT App 184 
(Cite as: Not Reported in PJd) 
since Defendant's commission of the END OF DOCUMENT 
crimes in this matter. For convenience, we 
therefore cite to the most recent version of 
the statutes. 
Further, in determining whether to impose 
consecutive sentences, the trial court is required to " 
consider the gravity and circumstances of the 
offenses, the number of victims, and the history, 
character, and rehabilitative needs of the defendant." 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(2). Defendant asserts 
that the trial court was unable to sufficiently 
consider "his history, his remorse, and his 
rehabilitative needs," in large part because a PSI 
had not been completed. 
*2 "Although the trial court did not explicitly 
address the enumerated factors in section 
[76-3-401(2) ], there is ample evidence in the 
record that the court considered these factors at the 
time of Defendant's sentencing." State v. 
Valdovinos, 2003 UT App 432, K 30, 82 P.3d 1167 
. The trial court here received evidence concerning 
Defendant's drug addiction, the recent 
hospitalization of his mother, his failing marriage, 
his recent unemployment, and his car braking down. 
The trial court also received evidence concerning 
Defendant's immediate remorse, his apology to the 
victim's family at trial, and the victim impact 
statements. As a result, we hold that the trial court 
sufficiently considered all of the sentencing factors 
and did not abuse its discretion by imposing 
consecutive sentences. Furthermore, Defendant's 
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is without 
merit because counsel was not "objectively deficient 
" in not objecting to the lack of a PSI and to the 
imposition of consecutive sentences. State v. 
Mecham, 2000 UT App 247, K 21, 9 P.3d 777. 
Accordingly, we affirm. 
WE CONCUR: PAMELA T. GREENWOOD, 
Associate Presiding Judge and JAMES Z. DAVIS, 
Judge. 
Utah App.,2006. 
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